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 subordinate levels (e.g., Northern Cardinal vs. other birds). Rosch 
and colleagues termed this intermediate level of abstraction the 
basic level.
According to Rosch and colleagues, the basic level carves nature 
at its joints. Categorizations at the basic level are fastest because 
they are the most natural way to divide up the world into different 
categories. Many features are shared among members of the same 
basic-level category and fewer features are shared between members 
of different basic-level categories. By contrast, members of differ-
ent subordinate categories share many features with members of 
similar subordinate categories (e.g., American Robins and Barn 
Swallows all have feathers, beaks, wings, and other features that 
are common to all birds) and members of the same superordinate 
category generally share relatively fewer features (e.g., relatively 
fewer visible features are common to all animals). In other words, 
basic-level categories are the highest intermediate level of a cat-
egory hierarchy where objects share similar shapes. The relative 
balance of intra-class and inter-class shape variability has been a 
strong theoretical component of many descriptions of the basic-
level advantage since the initial reports of Rosch and colleagues, 
and will be a point we return to again later in this review.
The enTry LeveL of CaTegorizaTion
Jolicoeur et al. (1984) referred to the fastest level of categorization 
as the entry level. For many category members, the basic level is the 
entry level, whereby “basic-level (categorization) occurs first and 
is followed, some time later, by subordinate-level identification” 
(Jolicoeur et al., 1984, p. 270). But, Jolicoeur and colleagues also 
observed that atypical members of basic-level categories could be 
categorized faster at the subordinate level (e.g., penguin) than the 
inTroduCTion
At a glance, we can detect an object in the environment, recognize 
it as an object we have seen before, categorize it as an animal or as 
a bird, or, if we are an expert, identify it as a male Indigo Bunting 
in winter plumage. What is the timing of visual object categoriza-
tions at different levels of abstraction, and how does that timing 
constrain theories of visual object categorization?
We begin this article by reviewing a body of empirical work that 
suggests that object categorization first occurs at a particular entry 
level, typically an intermediate, or basic level, of the conceptual hier-
archy, before categorizations at more subordinate or superordinate 
levels can be made. According to this view, basic-level categorization 
is a relatively early stage within the visual processing hierarchy. 
We contrast this view with a number of computational models 
of object categorization that propose no stage-like mechanism. 
We close by reviewing a body of more recent empirical work that 
investigates the timing of object categorization without invoking 
stage-like mechanisms.
The BasiC LeveL of CaTegorizaTion
The seminal work of Rosch and colleagues was among the first to 
ask whether particular kinds of object categorizations are made 
more quickly than others. With what is now a widely used speeded 
category verification task, participants were first shown a category 
label (e.g., “animal” or “bird” or “Northern Cardinal”), were then 
shown a picture containing an object, and were asked to verify 
whether the object was a member of the labeled category. Rosch 
et al. (1976) found that participants were fastest to verify object 
categories at an intermediate level (e.g., bird vs. other animals) 
than at more superordinate levels (e.g., animal vs. vehicle) or 
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basic level (e.g., bird). While the basic level may commonly be the 
entry level, that is not always the case. So whereas the basic level is 
defined ontologically and structurally as the highest intermediate 
level where objects share similar shapes, the entry level is defined 
behaviorally as the fastest level of categorization within a hierarchy.
Both the term “entry level” and its description implies a par-
ticular kind of object recognition process: The entry level is the 
level at which perceptual information first makes contact with 
stored representations and knowledge about objects. By this view, 
most objects are categorized first at the basic level (the entry level) 
before being categorized at more subordinate or superordinate lev-
els (Figure 1A). Categorizations at subordinate and superordinate 
levels follow according to a temporal hierarchy of processing stages. 
Basic-level categorization is not simply faster than more subordi-
nate or superordinate categorizations. Basic-level categorization is 
faster because basic-level categorization occurs before processing 
of more subordinate or superordinate categorizations can even 
begin – it is fastest because that stage of processing is a prerequisite 
for further stages of categorization.
The timing of object categorization is not simply based on the 
statistical structure of object categories, but can be affected by a 
perceiver’s experience and knowledge. Unlike novices, an expert 
bird watcher can categorize a picture at the subordinate level, iden-
tifying it as an Indigo Bunting, as quickly and accurately as they can 
categorize it at the basic level, as a bird (Tanaka and Taylor, 1991; 
Johnson and Mervis, 1997). Tanaka and Taylor characterized this 
expertise effect as an entry-level shift (Figure 2A). One possible 
explanation for this result is that, for experts, perceptual informa-
tion can make direct contact with subordinate category knowledge, 
whereas novices must first access the basic level.
deTeCTing, CaTegorizing, and idenTifying oBjeCTs
This view that basic-level categorization is literally an entry level, a 
stage of visual processing that precedes stages of categorization at 
other levels, was suggested by Grill-Spector and Kanwisher (2005). 
They conducted a series of speeded category verification experi-
ments that included simple object detection as well as basic-level 
categorization and subordinate-level identification. On some trials, 
participants would verify whether any object was present or not, 
while on other trials they would verify a basic-level category (e.g., 
bird), or verify a subordinate-level identity (e.g., Blue Jay). As a 
measure of the time course of these decisions, they systematically 
manipulated the exposure duration of the images. Examining accu-
racy as a function of exposure duration, they observed equivalent 
time courses for object detection and basic-level categorization that 
were both significantly faster than the time course for subordinate-
level identification (Figure 2B).
Grill-Spector and Kanwisher explained the equivalent timing 
of object detection and basic-level categorization by proposing 
that the very same perceptual mechanism both segments objects 
from the background and categorizes them at the basic level. 
Subordinate-level identification and superordinate-level cat-
egorization only take place at a subsequent stage of processing, 
as suggested by a literal interpretation of the entry level of cat-
egorization. This tight coupling between object detection and 
categorization was supported by another experiment by Grill-
Spector and Kanwisher (2005) where participants performed 
both object detection and categorization on the same trial with 
limited exposure duration. Their proposed mechanistic coupling 
of detection and categorization was supported by an observed 
behavioral coupling, whereby successful object detection on a 
given trial depended on the success of categorization on that 
same trial and vice-versa.
Based on these empirical results, the notion that basic-level cat-
egorization precedes more subordinate and superordinate levels 
of categorization certainly appears intuitive and compelling. The 
perceptual system is carving a visual image at its joints, extracting 
objects and their basic-level categorizations. Certain kinds of expe-
rience and expertise can further tune the visual system to initially 
extract objects at more subordinate levels of abstraction. However, 
Figure 1 | illustration of two competing accounts of the basic-level 
advantage in object categorization. Top panels illustrate the time course for 
basic-level (blue) and subordinate-level (red) categorization as a function of 
processing time. Bottom panels illustrate proposed categorization 
mechanisms over time. (A) Initial Basic-level Stage. After low-level visual 
processing, an initial stage of processing determines an object’s basic-level 
category. After this initial basic-level stage has completed, a subsequent stage 
determines the subordinate-level category. The basic-level advantage is 
observed because the basic-level stage happens first, as reflected by the early 
onset of its time course. (B) Accumulation of Perceptual Evidence. An 
alternative account does not invoke stages of processing for different 
categorization decisions. Categorization is determined by an accumulation of 
perceptual evidence over time. This account predicts no difference in the onset 
of the time course functions. The basic-level advantage is observed because 
basic-level categories engender a more rapid accumulation of perceptual 
evidence over time.
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and object representations, which are then mapped to known 
categories and identities of objects (Figure 3A). Basic-level cat-
egorization and subordinate-level identification are instantiated 
within the same output layer of the model. Similarly, Cottrell 
and colleagues (e.g., Joyce and Cottrell, 2004; Figure 3B) have 
proposed a hierarchy of visual processing that begins with Gabor 
filtering, goes through a stage of principal components analysis 
(PCA), and then a neural network mapping PCA representations 
onto known categories and identities of objects. Neither model 
has a basic-level categorization stage within the visual process-
ing hierarchy.
Exemplar-based models (e.g., Nosofsky, 1986; Kruschke, 1992; 
Nosofsky and Kruschke, 1992) also account well for object recogni-
tion, categorization, and identification. These models assume an 
initial stage of perceptual processing that creates a multidimen-
sional perceptual representation of a viewed object. This object 
representation activates stored object representations in memory 
according to their similarity to the viewed object, with perceptual 
dimensions more diagnostic of the particular category or identity 
decision receiving greater weight than non-diagnostic dimensions. 
this idea is quite provocative, in that many models of object recog-
nition propose no such initial stage of categorization (see Palmeri 
and Cottrell, 2009, for a recent review).
CaTegorizaTion and idenTifiCaTion in ModeLs of 
oBjeCT reCogniTion
According to many computational models, categorization and iden-
tification are perceptual decisions made at the same, relatively late 
stage of visual processing. These models propose no sequential 
stages where objects are first categorized at the basic level and only 
later processed at more subordinate or superordinate levels. Certain 
kinds of perceptual decisions may be more difficult or take longer 
than others because of similarity, experience, and other factors, but 
the added time is not because some decisions follow other decisions 
structurally within the visual processing hierarchy (Palmeri et al., 
2004; Mack et al., 2009; Figure 1B).
For example, one canonical model of visual object recognition 
(Riesenhuber and Poggio, 2000; Serre et al., 2007) assumes a hier-
archy of visual processing that begins with low-level features and 
conjunctions of features, moves on to view-based representations 
Figure 2 | Data from four common paradigms used to investigate the 
timing of visual object categorization. (A) Speeded Category Verification Task. 
On each trial, a superordinate, basic, or subordinate category label is presented 
followed by a pictured object. Participants verify whether the object is a member 
of the labeled category. The graph illustrates mean reaction times for 
categorization by novices (solid line) and experts (dotted line). Novices show a 
basic-level advantage. Experts show an entry-level shift, where subordinate 
categorizations are as fast as basic-level categorizations. Data from Tanaka and 
Taylor (1991). (B) Limited Exposure Duration. The time course of categorization is 
investigated by systematically varying the exposure duration of a masked 
stimulus. The top plot shows equivalent performance with upright objects for 
object detection (gray) and basic-level categorization (blue) for exposure durations 
ranging from 17 to 167 ms. In the bottom plot, these time courses are dissociated 
when the stimulus images are inverted, with basic-level categorization worse than 
object detection. Data from Mack et al. (2008). (C) Signal-to-Respond. The time 
course of categorization is investigated by systematically varying the time to 
respond. The STR paradigm asks participants to verify categories at different levels 
of abstraction, but responses must be made when a response signal is presented. 
Timing between the onset of the image and presentation of the response signal 
systematically maps out how categorization evolves over time. Performance for 
basic (blue) and subordinate (red) categorization is plotted as a function of reaction 
time plus response signal lag (open circles represent behavioral results and solid 
lines are fits of a shifted exponential curve). Critically, there is no difference in the 
onset of performance for these categorizations. The inset plots a zoomed in view 
of where the time courses first rise above-chance performance. Data from Mack 
et al. (2009). (D) Ultra-rapid Category Verification. Ultra-rapid categorization 
typically involves very brief stimulus exposures (<30 ms) and a go/no-go response 
to a target category at a superordinate or basic level. The graph illustrates the 
superordinate-level advantage for mean reaction times observed in ultra-rapid 
categorization. Data from Macé et al. (2009).
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outcome of similarity to exemplar objects. The model accounts 
for details of response times observed during categorization tasks. 
With some relatively simple assumptions about how experience 
with objects strengthens their representations, thereby influencing 
the rate of evidence accumulation, the model accounts for speed-
ups in response times over learning (Nosofsky and Palmeri, 1997; 
Palmeri, 1997, 1999b). Key to the present article, the model can also 
account for the entry-level shift with experience, predicting faster 
categorization at the basic level for novices but equal categorization 
at the basic and subordinate level for experts (Mack et al., 2007).
Lamberts (1995, 2000) recognized that perceptual processing 
takes variable amounts of time. Particularly salient perceptual 
dimensions might be processed more quickly than less salient 
perceptual dimensions, resulting in a multidimensional percep-
tual representation of a viewed object that develops over time. 
His model accounts for situations where salient object dimen-
sions dominate more rapid categorizations, but diagnostic, even 
if less salient, dimensions dominate more deliberative categoriza-
tions (Lamberts, 1998; see also Cohen and Nosofsky, 2003). For 
example, coarse object shape or color might be available quickly 
and dominate categorizations under speeded conditions, but finer 
perceptual details that take more time to become available, yet are 
more diagnostic of category, are used during unspeeded categori-
zations. This coarse-to-fine temporal dynamic is consistent with 
several lines of cognitive neuroscience research (e.g., see Fabre-
Thorpe, this issue).
In all of the models we reviewed, decisions about category or 
identity are instantiated at an output layer of the hierarchy. Some 
decisions take more time to make because they require a longer 
accumulation of noisier evidence, not because the stage of pro-
cessing that drives those decisions follows other stages and their 
decisions. Under rapid conditions, salient perceptual information 
may be available more quickly, which could cause decisions that 
These stored exemplar objects are associated with known categories 
or identities through weights learned by Hebbian or error-driven 
learning rules, depending on the particular model.
So neither the exemplar models nor many extant object recogni-
tion models propose a stage of categorization that precedes identifi-
cation. In fact, if anything, in all of these models representations of 
object identities, in the form of individual object representations, 
precede representations of object categories. Yet they can read-
ily account for basic-level advantages in category learning (e.g., 
Palmeri, 1999a; Joyce and Cottrell, 2004).
Exemplar-based models have been extended to account for the 
time course of object categorization. For example, according to 
the exemplar-based random walk model (EBRW; Nosofsky and 
Palmeri, 1997; Palmeri, 1997; Figure 3C), as an object activates 
similar stored object representations in memory, incremental evi-
dence is provided for competing categorizations. The incremental 
evidence is noisy, so it needs to be accumulated over time. As the 
name implies, EBRW assumes a random walk process, where evi-
dence favoring one category pushes the accumulated evidence in 
one direction while evidence in favor of the other category pushes 
it in the opposite direction. A categorization decision is made when 
the accumulated evidence reaches a response threshold. Analogous 
mechanisms readily allow for more than two alternative categoriza-
tions (Palmeri, 1997). EBRW is a member of a family of stochastic 
accumulator models (Ratcliff and Smith, 2004). So it inherits the 
success of these models in accounting for things like the shape of 
response time distributions and speed-accuracy tradeoffs. These 
models also provide compelling accounts of the neural processes 
engaged in perceptual decision making (e.g., Perrett et al., 1998; 
Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Purcell et al., 2010).
Exemplar-based random walk is unique among stochastic 
accumulator models as the first to provide a theory suggesting 
that the dynamic evidence accumulation in categorization is an 
Figure 3 | illustration of three computational models of visual object 
categorization. (A) Riesenhuber and Poggio’s (2000) model assumes a 
hierarchy of visual processing that begins with encoding of low-level features 
and feature conjunctions, moves on to view-based representations and object 
representations, which are then mapped to task units representing different 
levels of categorization. (B) Cottrell and colleagues’ model of object recognition 
proposes a hierarchy of visual processing of Gabor filtering, principal 
components analysis (PCA), and then a neural network mapping PCA 
representations onto known categories of objects (e.g., Joyce and Cottrell, 
2004). (C) Nosofsky and Palmeri’s (1997) exemplar-based random walk (EBRW) 
model proposes that the perceptual representation of an object activates similar 
stored object representations in memory providing incremental and noisy 
evidence toward a categorization decision. A decision is made once the random 
walk accumulation of perceptual evidence reaches a threshold. In all three 
computational models, decisions about category or identity are at a late decision 
stage of the visual processing hierarchy.
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categorization is significantly slower than object detection, which 
does not suggest a common visual process for detecting and cat-
egorizing objects.
Similarly, Mack and Palmeri (2010) noted that Grill-Spector 
and Kanwisher used people vs. cars as the two categories in their 
experiment attempting to demonstrate a behavioral coupling 
between object detection decisions and basic-level categoriza-
tion decisions. While by themselves these are basic-level cat-
egories, their contrast within the experiment spans different 
superordinate-level categories. Indeed, Mack and Palmeri showed 
that when categorizations instead involved a contrast within the 
same superordinate-level category (e.g., dog vs. bird) there was 
no evidence for a strong behavioral coupling of detection and 
categorization within the same trial. Instead, objects were often 
successfully detected without being successfully categorized (see 
also de la Rosa et al., 2011).
In all of these experiments, the timing of object detection and 
basic-level categorization were easily dissociated. If object detec-
tion and basic-level categorization take place at the same stage 
of visual processing, then image manipulations within a trial or 
manipulations of the contrast category across trials should affect 
detection and categorization similarly. They did not. Instead, this 
recent work is consistent with the assumptions made by the object 
categorization models reviewed earlier, where detecting, catego-
rizing, or identifying objects are perceptual decisions based on 
an accumulation of perceptual evidence. Some decisions may be 
made more quickly than others. But the relative timing of those 
decisions need not imply a commensurate timing of the stages of 
visual processing (Palmeri et al., 2004).
The TiMe Course of The BasiC-LeveL advanTage
While it is clear that the timing of basic-level categorization is not 
linked to the timing of object detection, what about the timing of 
basic-level and subordinate-level categorization? For non-experts, 
basic-level categorization is faster. Does basic-level categorization 
precede subordinate-level categorization or is it simply faster? 
Again, does fastest mean first?
Mack et al. (2009) contrasted the time course of basic- and 
 subordinate-level categorization using a well-known signal-
to-respond (STR) procedure. This procedure is similar to a speeded 
category verification task, but includes an explicit STR at a particu-
lar point in time. The signal is presented systematically at different 
delays after a stimulus appears in order to map out how categoriza-
tion performance evolves over time. Exposure duration is constant. 
STR limits the amount of time to make a decision.
Data from an STR procedure can be characterized by the onset, 
growth rate, and asymptote of categorization performance as a 
function of time. Of key interest for Mack et al. (2009) was the 
onset, which indicates the time when above-chance categorizations 
are possible. If basic-level categorization occurs first, then the onset 
of subordinate-level categorization should be significantly delayed 
relative to the onset of basic-level categorization, as illustrated in 
Figure 1A. In other words, there should be a window of time when 
only above-chance basic-level categorization is possible. However, 
Mack et al. (2009) observed equivalent onsets in the time course 
of basic- and subordinate-level categorization (Figure 2C). The 
only require salient perceptual information to be made quickly, but 
that does not mean that those decisions precede other decisions in 
the processing hierarchy.
This view of categorization as a relatively late perceptual deci-
sion process, not a stage of visual processing, is also consistent with 
emerging brain imaging data (e.g., Jiang et al., 2007) showing that 
activation of object-sensitive areas in inferotemporal cortex (IT) 
reflects object representations, not explicit category membership, 
which is instead reflected in activation of prefrontal cortex. This 
does not mean that top-down factors, such as attention to diagnos-
tic dimensions (e.g., see Palmeri and Gauthier, 2004), or perceptual 
learning (e.g., see Goldstone, 1998), cannot influence how percep-
tual representations are instantiated in IT (Folstein et al., 2010). It 
does imply that categorization is not a stage of processing in the 
ventral visual processing stream.
If there truly is a basic-level stage of visual processing – as sug-
gested by some characterization of the entry-level phenomena – this 
would seriously challenge these computational models. We now 
review more recent empirical work that challenges the stage-like 
view of categorization.
unCoupLing The TiMing of oBjeCT deTeCTion and 
CaTegorizaTion
If there exists an initial stage of visual processing that both detects 
and segments objects from the background and categorizes them 
at the basic level, then manipulations that affect categorization 
should also affect detection in the very same manner. Counter to 
this prediction, Mack et al. (2008) showed that stimulus inversion 
and image degradation impaired basic-level categorization but not 
object detection (Figure 2B). In these experiments, the time course 
of object detection was uncoupled from that of object categoriza-
tion. This timing difference suggests that detection and basic-level 
categorization are not the same visual process.
The timing of object categorizations in any experiment depends 
not only on the within-category similarity of a particular target cat-
egory, but also on what contrast categories are used in the experi-
ment (D’Lauro et al., 2008; Macé et al., 2009). Consider a speeded 
category verification experiment where half the items are dogs and 
the other half are cars. While both dog and car are themselves basic-
level categories, the contrast within the experiment between dogs 
and cars vary across vastly different superordinate-level categories. 
This means that on some trials, a participant verifies a picture of a 
dog as a dog, but on other trials denies that a picture of a car is a 
dog, which is an easy perceptual decision to make. Consider instead 
an experiment where half the test items are dogs and the other 
half are cats. Now both are basic-level categories and the contrast 
between them is within the same superordinate-level category. 
Bowers and Jones (2008) showed that categorization using a distant 
between-category contrast (e.g., dog vs. bus) was as fast as object 
detection, as observed by Grill-Spector and Kanwisher (2005). 
But categorization with a more similar between-category contrast 
(e.g., dog vs. cat) was significantly slower than object detection. 
Even though participants had the same basic-level category as 
a target (dog) in each case, the speed of the categorization was 
affected by the ontological distance of the contrast category (see 
also Macé et al., 2009). With a true basic level contrast,  basic-level 
Mack and Palmeri Timing of categorization
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may favor an object’s superordinate-level category (Rogers and 
Patterson, 2007; Macé et al., 2009; Fabre-Thorpe, under review). 
Additional exposure would be necessary to encode more detailed 
features required for fast and accurate basic- or  subordinate-level 
categorization. That said, it is clear that one important direction 
for future research on the timing of object categorization is to 
reconcile the classic finding of a basic-level advantage observed 
during speeded category verification with the superordinate-level 
advantage observed during ultra-rapid categorization, and to pro-
vide an explanation within a single theoretical framework (Mack 
and Palmeri, 2011).
suMMary
In this article, we outlined two diverging theoretical perspectives 
on how the visual system categorizes objects. According to one, 
the relative timing of object categorization implies a relative 
timing of stages of visual processing: An early stage of visual 
processing both detects and categorizes objects at the basic level 
before categorizations at more subordinate or superordinate 
levels can occur. According to the other, the relative timing of 
object categorization reflects the timing of the availability of 
perceptual features and the quality of perceptual evidence used 
to drive a perceptual decision process: Certain categorizations 
can be made more quickly than others, but that is not because 
those categorizations occur before others in the visual process-
ing hierarchy.
On the surface, the finding from speeded category verification 
that basic-level categorization is faster than either  superordinate- 
or subordinate-level categorization, or the finding from ultra-
rapid categorization that superordinate-level categorization is 
faster than either basic- or subordinate-level categorization, seems 
consistent with stages of visual processing. But while stages of 
processing are sufficient to account for the relative timing, they 
are not necessary.
Indeed, computational models have little difficulty accounting 
for relative timing differences without invoking stages of processing 
(e.g., Palmeri and Gauthier, 2004; Mack et al., 2007; Palmeri and 
Tarr, 2008; Palmeri and Cottrell, 2009). Many computational mod-
els assume a visual processing hierarchy with perceptual decisions 
regarding recognition, categorization, or identification near the end 
of the network. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a coherent stages 
of processing account where basic-level categorization occurs first 
under some task conditions but superordinate-level categorization 
occurs first under other task conditions.
We also reviewed empirical evidence that is inconsist-
ent with the stages of processing account. Grill-Spector and 
Kanwisher (2005) observed a coupling of object detection and 
basic-level categorization. These were uncoupled in a series of 
published papers that followed (Bowers and Jones, 2008; Mack 
et al., 2008; Mack and Palmeri, 2010; de la Rosa et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, detailed examination of the time course of basic- 
and  subordinate-level categorization does not indicate stages 
either (Mack et al., 2009).
While a clearer picture is emerging about the timing of visual 
object categorization, there are still unanswered questions. Chief 
among these is fully understanding how the relative timing of 
STR curves only differed in growth rate and asymptote. Basic-level 
categorizations may be made faster than subordinate-level categori-
zations, but a basic-level stage of visual processing does not precede 
categorization at other levels.
uLTra-rapid oBjeCT CaTegorizaTion
A parallel line of research over the past decade has characterized 
the timing of object categorization using an ultra-rapid categori-
zation task (e.g., Thorpe et al., 1996; Fabre-Thorpe et al., 2001; 
VanRullen and Thorpe, 2001; Macé et al., 2009). A typical ultra-
rapid experiment asks participants to verify the category of objects 
in images that are presented very briefly (<30 ms). Most use a go/
no-go task with objects from one target category (the “go”) inter-
mixed with objects from distractor categories (the “no-go”). For 
example, “animal” might be the target category and participants 
press a key (“go”) only when an animal is detected in the briefly 
presented images.
In this task, not only are the image exposures ultra-rapid, but 
responses are ultra-rapid as well. Accurate manual responses verify-
ing object category are made as quickly as 250 ms after the stimulus 
appears (VanRullen and Thorpe, 2001). Accurate saccade responses 
are even faster, within 150 ms (Kirchner and Thorpe, 2006; Bacon-
Macé et al., 2007). ERP measures also show a divergence in target 
vs. non-target waveforms at frontal electrode sites only 150 ms after 
stimulus onset (Thorpe et al., 1996).
What’s striking with respect to the other work we have reviewed 
so far is that ultra-rapid categorization tasks show ultra-rapid cat-
egorization at the superordinate level. It is abstract categories, like 
animals or vehicles, that are so rapidly detected in images. Indeed, 
the speed of ultra-rapid categorization led to the speculation that 
superordinate categorization represents the category to which the 
visual system has the fastest access (Thorpe et al., 1996; Fabre-
Thorpe et al., 2001), leaving little room for even faster basic-level 
categorization (VanRullen and Thorpe, 2001). In fact, in ultra-
rapid categorization tasks, superordinate-level categorization is 
significantly faster and more accurate than basic-level categoriza-
tion (Macé et al., 2009; see Figure 2D).
One interpretation of the findings from ultra-rapid categoriza-
tion is akin to the interpretation of the basic-level advantage from 
speeded category verification that we reviewed at the outset of 
this article. An initial stage of superordinate-level categorization 
precedes categorization at other levels. An object’s superordinate 
category is determined first and guides subsequent categoriza-
tions at more specific levels in the conceptual hierarchy (Thorpe 
et al., 1996). Of course, this proposal cannot be reconciled with 
the directly opposite proposal that an initial stage of basic-level 
categorization precedes categorization at other levels (Grill-Spector 
and Kanwisher, 2005).
An alternative interpretation is that the timing of visual percep-
tual processing can systematically affect the timing of object catego-
rization. Because ultra-rapid categorization severely limits exposure 
duration, it limits the amount of perceptual processing of an image 
that can occur. With limited exposure, it is likely that only relatively 
coarse and potentially salient visual properties of an image are 
encoded (Lamberts and Freeman, 1999). This means that the per-
ceptual information available early in the time course of  encoding 
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object categorizations can vary so considerably under speeded 
category verification vs. ultra-rapid categorization paradigms. 
We are beginning to make empirical progress in understanding 
these differences (Mack and Palmeri, 2011), but a theoretical 
account still needs to be established. In addition, there is clear 
evidence that the timing of object categorization changes with 
experience (Tanaka and Taylor, 1991), but more work is needed 
to unravel the precise time course of categorization by experts 
and novices in order to understand how the timing of these 
perceptual decisions varies with expertise, and how experience 
impacts the representations and processes underlying object 
categorization.
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